Encounter). Whether or not this significant plurality trend will continue is unclear. The president of Argentina has usually enjoyed a significant amount of support in congress from his/her own party and coalitions. Mainwaring and Shugart's table11.1 shows Argentina President to have an average support of 48.3% in the Lower House and 52% in the upper house. Including coalition partners 49% in the Lower House and 52.0% in the upper house supports the president. This kind of congressional composition has the ability to inhibit checks and balance by a minority party. This is the extreme of winner take all politics, majority politics. In the last presidential election, the PJ (Personist Party) won 49.8% of the vote, not closely followed the FG (FREPASO) with 29.2%, followed by the UCR (Radical Civic Union). Since then, the PJ has lost a significant majority and only through a coalition between with other party can it hope to achieve a congressional majority. Effective Parties Mainwaring and Shugart argue those institutional arrangements like timing and type of election has an impact on the number of parties, as well as, the district magnitude. Countries with high district magnitude are likely to have more parties. Holding congressional elections non-concurrently and electing presidents by majority run-off, individually, contribute to fractionalization. Holding and congressional elections concurrently and electing presidents by plurality contribute create less parties. In Brazil, after 1994, there have been many effective parties. Mainwaring an Shugart's Table 11.2 in Chapter 11 shows Brazil to have an average of 6.08 effective parties in the lower house and 9.5 effective parties in the upper house. Brazil has congressional elections concurrently and uses the majority runoff for presidential elections. In comparison, Brazil's 1954-1990 non-concurrent congressional elections, the average of effective parties varied ...
