he Lanham Act prohibits the use of any symbol ordevice that is likely to deceive consumers as to the associa-tion, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services by anotherperson. Wendt's and Ratzenberger's claim was for falseendorsement--that by using an imitation of their unique phys-ical characteristics, Host misrepresented their association withand endorsement of the Cheers bar concept.[9] To determine if it was likely that Host's conduct createda likelihood of confusion as to whether Wendt and Ratzenber-ger were endorsing Host's product, an eight-factor testapplied. This test required consideration of (1) the strength ofthe plaintiff's mark; (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) similar-ity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) market-ing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7)defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood ofexpansion of the product lines.[10] On remand, the district court simply compared therobots with Wendt and Ratzenberger and awarded judgmentbecause there was no similarity. The court erred in failing toanalyze any of the other relevant factors to determine whetherthere was a likelihood of confusion to consumers as towhether Wendt and Ratzenberger sponsored, approved of, orwere otherwise associated with the Cheers bars. [11] TheLanham Act's likelihood of confusion standard is predomi- 12351nantly factual. Summary judgment is inappropriate when ajury could reasonably conclude that most of the factorsweighed in the plaintiff's favor.[12] The district court erred in rejecting the Lanham Actclaim at the summary judgment stage because a jury couldreasonably have concluded that most of the factors weighedin favor of Wendt and Ratzenberger. They were principalplayers on Cheers, a popular television show. They were wellknown among the target customers of Host's Cheers bars. Ajury could reasonably have concluded that their mark wasstrong.[13] For the sa...
