me reasons, their "goods" (their skills andfame as actors) were obviously related to Host's "goods" (theproducts sold in the Cheers bars and the bars themselves)even if they were not strictly competitive. The issue waswhether a consumer would be confused as to Wendt's andRatzenberger's association with or sponsorship of Host's bars.The source of their fame and the Host bars was identical: theCheers television series.[14] Similarity of the marks was the primary issue in dis-pute. Because Wendt and Ratzenberger raised triable issues ofmaterial fact concerning the degree to which the robotsresembled them, a reasonable jury might have found that thisfactor weighed in their favor. Under the Lanham Act, in cam-era inspection is not sufficient. The district court had to viewthe marks as they appeared in the marketplace.[15] Wendt and Ratzenberger presented evidence of actualconsumer confusion in their declarations and in the form ofsurvey evidence. This evidence should not have beenexcluded. Sufficient evidence existed by which a reasonablejury might have inferred actual consumer confusion.[16] The factor of marketing channels used weighed infavor of Wendt and Ratzenberger. The allegation that appro- 12352priating their likenesses because the target audience of theCheers bars was customers who were fans of the televisionseries was a similarity in marketing channels that suggestedthat there was at least a likelihood of consumer confusion.[17] The factor of degree of purchaser care weighed infavor of Wendt and Ratzenberger as well. Consumers werenot likely to be particularly careful in determining whoendorses or is affiliated with an airport bar in which theymight purchase a single beverage. They would be even lesslikely to scrutinize the source of the figures used to attractpatrons. This low degree of care made confusion of sponsor-ship likely.[18] Wendt and Ratzenberger alleged facts that could havegiven rise to a...
