ls of violence and the predominant targets tended to be the oldestablished powers and, more specifically, the representations and agents ofthe British state. The evidence presented here thus tends to confirm the theory,although more empirical workboth qualitative and quantitativelikelydeserves to be done to help verify these findings. There are also,inevitably, certain dimensions of these case studies that I did not exploreor explainsuch as how different classes are seen as either the champions orenemies of nationalism under different conditionswhich might prove fruitfulground for further research. It is interesting, for example, that in theU.S. and even Canada, the poorer, immigrant classes tended to be the targetsof wartime sensitivity to foreignness, while this is reversed in Ireland,where the titled upper class is associated with foreignness. Anotherinteresting issue involves the degree to which immigrant societies, likeCanada and the United States, are likely affected by war in ways differentfrom more homogenous societies. Notwithstanding this need for further study,we are nonetheless left with a rather parsimonious explanation of theconsequences of war that relies on the variable of nation-state fusion, andwhich manages to explain broad facets of war's effect on the character ofcivil society across a wide range of cases. In the next section, I want to briefly elaborate on a more philosophicalimplication of this research insofar as it addresses the issues of patrioticallegiance and the maintenance or sustenance of a liberal constitutionalorder. II. Political theory and the politics of patriotism"Every political society," writes Charles Taylor, "requires some sacrificesand demands some disciplines from it members."[5] In particular, a freesociety requires a kind of "self-imposed discipline" to motivate citizens torespect and defend the laws and institutions of the state. In despoticpolitical systems, social order...
