and discipline are preserved through the useof fear and coercion. But, in a liberal-constitutional republic, Taylorargues that one has to replace this coercion with something else. This canonly be a willing identification with the polis on the part of the citizens,a sense that the political institutions in which they live are an expressionof themselves.[6] This is, I think, an important point, and defenders ofliberal constitutionalismand I count myself among themwould do well toacknowledge it. Yet, for Taylor, liberal constitutionalism cannot rely solely ona civic consciousness to maintain the integrity of its institutions. A civicconsciousness involves merely the awareness of shared problems and purposesin public life: that there is, in other words, a distinctively publicdimension of social order in which individuals participate freely as equalsto address issues of common concern. A civic consciousness presumes thatindividuals can and sometimes do act to promote their "enlightened"interests. Tocqueville argues:[Action in the public sphere] springs from knowledge; it is nurtured by thelaws; it grows by the exercise of civil rights; and , in the end, it isconfounded with the personal interests of the citizen. A man comprehends theinfluence which the well-being of his country has upon his own; he is awarethat the laws permit him to contribute to that prosperity, and he labors topromote it, at first because it benefits him, and secondly because it in parthis own work.[7] Talyor supposes, however, that to obtain the kind of sacrifice necessary forthe preservation of a liberal society will likely require a strongermotivation than merely an enlightened self-interest that is implied by acivic consciousness. Pure enlightened self-interest, he argues, willnever move enough people strongly enough to constitute a real threat topotential despots and putschists.[8] A liberal-constitutional republic, inshort, must ultimately depend...
