is potentially dangerous because the bonds of community areapparently what make it possible to live a moral life. MacIntyre argues thatif I am "brought into being and maintained as a moral agent only through theparticular kind of moral sustenance afforded by my community, then it isclear that deprived of this community, I am unlikely to flourish as a moralagent..Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose...hold upon allgenuine standards of judgment."[14] Similarly, Taylor writes: "The conceptionof identity is the view that outside the horizon provided by some mastervalue or some allegiance or some community membership, I would be criticallycrippled, would become unable to ask and answer these questions effectively,and would thus be unable to function as a full human subject."[15] There are at least two general objections that I would like toraise against this normative defense of patriotism understood as an emotionalallegiance to the national community. First, the moral issue here is notsimply whether humans derive their moral agency from belonging to and sharingin some form of community, for that is likely true and natural enough. Themoral problem, rather, is whether or not national loyalty and allegianceought to be ranked above all else as a general moral principle. This appearsto me exceedingly dangerous. Unconditional, emotional attachment to thecommunity would seemingly have few bounds. The issue, however, is not thissimple. Passionate attachment to the nation is not just directed to the factthat one belongs to a nation. National attachment might also flow from thefact that the nation claims and remembers a particular purpose ormissioneven if this purpose is simply to maintain the integrity of thesocial boundaries that define the nation. In other words, emotionalattachment to the nation rests on the broad, shared purposes that a nationclaims to pursue. Hence the moral value of, say, a liberal nation is ...
