notjust that the national community is shared (as Taylor sometimes suggests),but that liberalism is shared. Thus, the moral problem is whether and how todecide if the shared purpose of a given community or nation is morally just. I cannot pretend to have any answers about which national purposes should beconsidered morally legitimate, but this does, I think, put the problem in itsproper context. Second, it is not altogether clear that the sacrifices necessaryto maintain liberal constitutionalism require a strong emotionalidentification with the nation. Indeed deep emotional identifications may doas much to undermine the substance of liberal constitutionalism as they do tosustain them. This insight is fairly demonstrated in the qualitativeempirical evidence presented in this study. A strong emotional commitment tothe nation tends in cases of strong nation-state fusion to inspire greatercivic participation and connection to political institutions, but it alsotends to constrict the social boundaries defining citizenship and legitimateactivity and expression. The paradox seems to be that while a civicconsciousness rests on a form of free deliberation among equals, theboundaries of who is included or excluded is determined by emotionalidentification. To the extent that the overriding value is to be asinclusive as possiblei.e. to allow individuals qua individuals and notmerely as a member of a nation or group to participate freely as equals in ashared public lifethe more likely that it is necessary to find either (1)other forms of civic obligation besides an emotional national identification,or (2) to accept that civil society might not be as robust as we hope. A thoroughgoing civic education and norm of active civicengagement may partly alleviate the first problem, but I think we also havesimply to be content with the latter implication. Namely, that civil societyis not likely on its own accord consistently to prov...
