s it his aim to rise to knowledge superior to the common, ought to be ashamedto seek occasions of doubting from the vulgar forms of speech: instead, therefore, of doing this, I shallproceed with the matter in hand, and inquire whether I had a clearer and more perfect perception of thepiece of wax when I first saw it, and when I thought I knew it by means of the external sense itself, or,at all events, by the common sense (sensus communis), as it is called, that is, by the imaginativefaculty; or whether I rather apprehend it more clearly at present, after having examined with greatercare, both what it is, and in what way it can be known. It would certainly be ridiculous to entertain anydoubt on this point. For what, in that first perception, was there distinct ? What did I perceive whichany animal might not have perceived ? But when I distinguish the wax from its exterior forms, andwhen, as if I had stripped it of its vestments, I consider it quite naked, it is certain, although some errormay still be found in my judgment, that I cannot, nevertheless, thus apprehend it without possessing ahuman mind.[ L][ F]15. But finally, what shall I say of the mind itself, that is, of myself ? for as yet I do not admit that I amanything but mind. What, then! I who seem to possess so distinct an apprehension of the piece ofwax, do I not know myself, both with greater truth and certitude, and also much more distinctly andclearly? For if I judge that the wax exists because I see it, it assuredly follows, much more evidently,that I myself am or exist, for the same reason: for it is possible that what I see may not in truth bewax, and that I do not even possess eyes with which to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see,or, which comes to the same thing, when I think I see, I myself who think am nothing. So likewise, if Ijudge that the wax exists because I touch it, it will still also follow that I am; and if I determine that myimagination, or any o...
