dement, F.) which perceives it. I speak of one piece in particular; for as to wax ingeneral, this is still more evident. But what is the piece of wax that can be perceived only by the[understanding or] mind? It is certainly the same which I see, touch, imagine; and, in fine, it is the samewhich, from the beginning, I believed it to be. But (and this it is of moment to observe) the perceptionof it is neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination, and never was either of these, though itmight formerly seem so, but is simply an intuition (inspectio) of the mind, which may be imperfect andconfused, as it formerly was, or very clear and distinct, as it is at present, according as the attention ismore or less directed to the elements which it contains, and of which it is composed.[ L][ F]13. But, meanwhile, I feel greatly astonished when I observe [the weakness of my mind, and] itsproneness to error. For although, without at all giving expression to what I think, I consider all this inmy own mind, words yet occasionally impede my progress, and I am almost led into error by the termsof ordinary language. We say, for example, that we see the same wax when it is before us, and notthat we judge it to be the same from its retaining the same color and figure: whence I should forthwithbe disposed to conclude that the wax is known by the act of sight, and not by the intuition of the mindalone, were it not for the analogous instance of human beings passing on in the street below, asobserved from a window. In this case I do not fail to say that I see the men themselves, just as I saythat I see the wax; and yet what do I see from the window beyond hats and cloaks that might coverartificial machines, whose motions might be determined by springs ? But I judge that there are humanbeings from these appearances, and thus I comprehend, by the faculty of judgment alone which is inthe mind, what I believed I saw with my eyes.[ L][ F]14. The man who make...
