But it is true, perhaps, that those very things which I suppose to be non-existent, becausethey are unknown to me, are not in truth different from myself whom I know. This is a point I cannotdetermine, and do not now enter into any dispute regarding it. I can only judge of things that areknown to me: I am conscious that I exist, and I who know that I exist inquire into what I am. It is,however, perfectly certain that the knowledge of my existence, thus precisely taken, is not dependenton things, the existence of which is as yet unknown to me: and consequently it is not dependent onany of the things I can feign in imagination. Moreover, the phrase itself, I frame an image (efffingo),reminds me of my error; for I should in truth frame one if I were to imagine myself to be anything, sinceto imagine is nothing more than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing; but I alreadyknow that I exist, and that it is possible at the same time that all those images, and in general all thatrelates to the nature of body, are merely dreams [or chimeras]. From this I discover that it is not morereasonable to say, I will excite my imagination that I may know more distinctly what I am, than toexpress myself as follows: I am now awake, and perceive something real; but because my perception isnot sufficiently clear, I will of express purpose go to sleep that my dreams may represent to me theobject of my perception with more truth and clearness. And, therefore, I know that nothing of all that Ican embrace in imagination belongs to the knowledge which I have of myself, and that there is need torecall with the utmost care the mind from this mode of thinking, that it may be able to know its ownnature with perfect distinctness.[ L][ F]8. But what, then, am I ? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thingthat doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses; that imagines also, and perceives.[ L][ F...
