]9. Assuredly it is not little, if all these properties belong to my nature. But why should they not belongto it ? Am I not that very being who now doubts of almost everything; who, for all that, understandsand conceives certain things; who affirms one alone as true, and denies the others; who desires toknow more of them, and does not wish to be deceived; who imagines many things, sometimes evendespite his will; and is likewise percipient of many, as if through the medium of the senses. Is therenothing of all this as true as that I am, even although I should be always dreaming, and although hewho gave me being employed all his ingenuity to deceive me ? Is there also any one of these attributesthat can be properly distinguished from my thought, or that can be said to be separate from myself ?For it is of itself so evident that it is I who doubt, I who understand, and I who desire, that it is hereunnecessary to add anything by way of rendering it more clear. And I am as certainly the same beingwho imagines; for although it may be (as I before supposed) that nothing I imagine is true, still thepower of imagination does not cease really to exist in me and to form part of my thought. In fine, I amthe same being who perceives, that is, who apprehends certain objects as by the organs of sense,since, in truth, I see light, hear a noise, and feel heat. But it will be said that these presentations arefalse, and that I am dreaming. Let it be so. At all events it is certain that I seem to see light, hear anoise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire),which is nothing else than thinking.[ L][ F]10. From this I begin to know what I am with somewhat greater clearness and distinctness thanheretofore. But, nevertheless, it still seems to me, and I cannot help believing, that corporeal things,whose images are formed by thought [which fall under the senses], and are examined by the same, areknow...
