of a contingent being as not being, it is impossible to think of a necessary being as not being. It is impossible for a necessary being not to exist by definition. Then, it follows that there is a possible being that exists by the law of noncontradiction, that is, it is impossible to conceive of a necessary being as not existing. Since it also follows from earlier that there cannot only be contingent beings, it follows that a necessary being is actual from the fact that it is possible.The meaning of "possible" may not seem a very common one. When we usually speak of something as possible, we mean it like we do contingent, that is that it may be or it may not be. However, common language allows for the technical meaning that Leibniz gives it. Consider the expression, "the only possible choice." If something is the only one possible, then it necessarily is. In this sense, it would be nonsense to speak of the word "possible" as if it meant the same thing as "contingent." The word "possible" means in the Leibnizian sense what we mean by possibility when we use expressions like "the only possible choice." It is not, however, to be assumed that "possible" means that there is only one possible being like in the expression "only possible choice." It simply means "possible" in the same sense that it means in that expression. That is, a "possible" being is one which is not self-contradictory to conceive.In summary of Leibniz, it turns out that contingency depends upon necessity because of the principle of sufficient reason and the law against infinite regress in regards to contingent beings. Furthermore, it turns out that necessary beings are possible because they cannot be negated by definition. Finally, possible beings exist because the contradiction of them is incoherent. Since something is possible, it follows that something is necessary. Therefore, God exists. Let me present my version of the argument to redemonstrate the points that I belie...
