ally possible. Can a thing be said to be shown to exist if one posits an existing thing to begin with? It may seem obvious that something exists, but why it seems obvious is that it is self-contradictory to say otherwise. It is that quality of the ontological proof of the type that Anselm proposes, of showing the self-contradictory nature of the opposite, which makes a bit more arguing needed. It was said of all things which exist, that they exist necessarily or contingently, but why suppose that any particular thing exists at all? On its own, the cosmological argument may beg the question in assuming the existence of a thing in proving the existence of a thing—in this case, God. It remains to be shown that there exists a thing such that we may say that it is contingent or necessary. If we could, then the cosmological conclusion that a necessary being exists would follow from that. The ontological argument of Leibniz demonstrates a possible being, that is the "thing" that the cosmological argument assumes.Leibniz’s ontological argument is really a demonstration of a possible being, that is a being which is not self-contradictory. Leibniz defines God as a necessary being (Leibniz 242). Furthermore, a necessary being "involves no limits, no negation and consequently no contradiction" (Leibniz 242). Therefore, it follows that a necessary being is absolutely possible. Remember that a contingent being had been defined as one in which the contradiction was possible and that a necessary being was defined as one where the opposite involved contradiction. It would seem at first glance that there is something inconsistent in talking about the possibility of something that admits of no opposite. Leibniz does not mean by "possible" the same as what he means by "contingent." "Possible" means that the proposition itself is not self-contradictory regardless of whether that being is necessary or contingent. While it is possible to conceive ...
