anything as long as one gives it the attribute of necessary existence. This is not the case, and there is a distinction to be drawn between meaningful and meaningless propositions about necessary beings. For instance, one example of an absurdity which supposedly follows from the ontological argument is that one could conceive of a circular square which necessarily exists. If God follows from the fact that God has necessary existence, why not the existence of all sorts of other things which are obviously absurd like circular squares? This is not a difficult objection. A possible being has been defined as that which is not self-contradictory. Therefore, one cannot argue for the existence of a circular square which necessarily exists because it falls under the class of impossible beings; that is, a circular square is a being which is self-contradictory. Therefore, it does not follow that the attribute of necessary existence can be given to just any subject in the universe. Consider the Anselmian argument for a moment. God was defined as "something such that we cannot conceive of it as not existing." It makes no sense to give necessary existence to something that cannot be conceived to begin with. Circular squares cannot be conceived, and so it is a nonsensical counter-example. What I assume is that circular squares cannot be conceived, but that is the whole point of the counter-example. I need not argue why they cannot be conceived because if they can, then it is no contradiction to say that circular squares have the quality of necessary existence if conceiving otherwise is a contradiction. So, either circular squares cannot be conceived and are impossible or they can be conceived and are not so obviously absurd. In either case, whether conceivable or not, the counter-example has no effect upon the argument.Secondly, one may try to propose a being that in and of itself is a possible being and try to give it the attribute of necessary exis...
