tence. Let us consider the necessarily existing chair, which is our representation of a contingent being. Does it follow from the ontological argument that such a being necessarily exists? Chairs are possible beings, and necessarily existing beings are possible beings. Yet, the two notions—that is, chairs as possible also being necessary beings because necessary beings are possible—remain self-contradictory. Chairs by their nature are contingent beings, and it is impossible for a being to be both contingent and necessary, and so the proposition is self-contradictory and belongs to the class of impossible beings.The principle that discovers real necessary existential propositions from meaningless propositions phrased like necessary existential propositions is the law of noncontradiction. Anything more that is said about necessity and about God must not be self-contradictory in any way or else it violates how a necessary being has been defined. What I mean is that whatever attributes one gives to God that do not seem readily apparent by the bare definition of God must not violate the definition of a necessary being. The first counter-example violated it because it proposed that an impossible being was a necessary being; the second, because it proposed that a contingent being was a necessary being. Whatever attributes further define God, they too must be necessary.Kant and Russell both knew that their analyses depended upon the law of noncontradiction. They tried to show that the proposition, "God necessarily exists" is self-contradictory in that they claimed that propositions could not assert their own existence and that "God necessarily exists" claims to be what it cannot be. Furthermore, they might not deny the axioms of the principle of sufficient reason and the law against infinite regress. Yet, what they will say is that my entire analysis has begged the question because it is the very existence of those axioms which can ...
