e must be a necessary being if there are contingent beings.Why is it a chair and not something else? Well, let us say that the explanation is that a chair can be sat upon. Well, what explains what being sat upon is from what it is not? Surely, I can conceive of something else than the state of being sat upon. If this kind of reasoning were to continue, there would be no sufficient reason at all. However, we concluded that there was a sufficient reason lest there be no contingent beings. Therefore, Leibniz, cosmologically, concludes that a necessary being, God, exists.The controversies over this argument involve whether there is such a thing as a principle of sufficient reason and a law against infinite regress. However, those who deny the principles at the same time deny the existence of contingent beings. Either they deny the principle of sufficient reason, and as has been shown above, there is no distinction between a contingent being and its opposite; or, they deny the law against infinite regress, and there never is a reason sufficient to explain the distinction between a contingent being and its opposite. It is not possible for a thing to be contingent if it is not possible for it to be something else. If there are an infinity of explanations for both opposites, then it follows that there is no distinction between the one and the other. Without distinction, the meaning of a contingent being is lost. And, so Russell and Kant, in order to maintain consistency in their position, must also accept the principle of sufficient reason and the law against infinite regress. The consequence of failing to do so would be to acknowledge that everything that exists is necessary!The prior argument amounts to the cosmological argument for the existence of God, but all cosmological arguments assume possibility. This will never be absolutely convincing of a necessary being because it remains to be seen whether there is anything particular which is re...
