One of the Nyaya arguments against the claim that consciousness is a property of the body is as follows: “[Premise 1] All bodily qualia the causes of which continue to be available, endure as long as the body exists, for example, color and so on. [Premise 2] No conscious states endure as long as the body exists. [Conclusion] Therefore, no conscious states are bodily qualia the causes of which continue to be available.” With the first premise, the Nyaya states that even though qualia such as color change in a body, if the cause of those qualia do not disappear, those bodily qualia will last as long as the body. With the second premise, the Nyaya states that the body outlasts all conscious states. For instance, conscious states are always lacking in a dead body. From the first and second premises, the Nyaya rightly conclude that there are no conscious states that are properties of the body because the materialist has not been able to show that a cause is lacking in cases where the body is not conscious. The Nyaya’s original first premise is stated, “All qualia of the body endures as long as the body does, for example color and the like.” The materialists refuted this premise by indicating that qualia such as color might not endure as long as the body because a person could dye his hair. The Nyaya then realized that in cases such as someone dying his hair, the causes of the qualia are still available so the quality of having color is still present despite change in hair color. A materialist might state that qualia such as having skin, muscles, and organs are not classified as qualia of the body because their cause always disappear before the body has fully decomposed. Thus, the materialist might argue that it does not make logical sense that qualia such as having color, which every single object has, are part of the body but that qualia such as having skin, which are somewhat unique to the human body becau...
