se not all objects have these qualia, are not. The Nyaya, however, could argue this by stating that in cases of having no skin, muscle, or organs, the causes of the qualia are lacking and so the loss of qualia such as having skin is explainable. In the case of consciousness, there is no such explanation available so the Nyaya added the phrase, “the causes of which continue to exist” to the original first premise.There is a possible materialist response to why there is no consciousness in the body: its cause, electrical brain activity, is not available in a dead body. Consciousness could be the first thing to go whenever the body is dead because its cause is gone; thus, whenever there is a dead body, there is also no consciousness. The Nyaya, however, might argue that there is no way to prove that electrical activity in the brain is the cause of consciousness. The Nyaya would probably concur that the brain is an instrument of consciousness but also assert that “it by no means follows that the brain is itself the conscious knower” (136). “Additionally, the arguments based on the lack of cotemporality, pervasiveness, and utter dissimilarity also go to show that consciousness is not a state (or quale) of the brain” (136). Similar to the Nyaya’s objections with any example the materialist has heretofore presented, the Nyaya could again respond that the materialists can not propose electrical activity in the brain as part of the debate because it is under dispute. According to the Nyaya epistemology of inference, the general acceptability of inductive examples (GAIE) states that both sides must agree on something as the basis of the debate. With the example stated by the materialist in the previous paragraph, the Nyaya could state that under GAIE, electrical activity is disputed by the Nyaya so it is futile for the materialist to try to prove that the cause of consciousness in a body is electrical ac...
