ave a reality as a pure being or ISNESS (Hegel, 93). In this dialectic of the object, the apprehension of the object as being can occur in two indexical cases, the first as a NOW (temporal indexical) and the second as a HERE or THIS (locational indexical). In both cases sense-certainty's attempts to indicate the object which it has apprehended as the repository of knowledge fail because, upon examination, both indexicals are shown to be entirely vacuous. Hegel's' proof of the critical limitations of these terms is based on the idea that both NOW and THIS cannot of themselves differentiate an actual location or time without the support of more complex assertions, namely NOW as differentiated from all other NOWS or THIS as differentiated from all other THISES. As a result, the NOW and THIS that intend to refer to particular objects instead refer to the universal cases of NOWNESS and THISNESS, cases which contain a knowledge that is no real knowledge at all (Hegel, 95-99). Hegel's most cogently outlines the failures inherent in the dialectic of the object by approaching the NOW and THIS as if they were written down on paper, reintroducing his theme of linguistic communication as prerequisite of real knowledge. As we imagine these terms written down, we quickly see that NOW alone on paper cannot differentiate itself from other NOWS (and the same for THIS), so that the NOW of today is equal to the NOW of tomorrow and therefore both are meaningless (Hegel, 95). Realizing the abstract generality of undifferentiated objectness located in the dialectic of the object, sense-certainty attempts to resolve this failure by referring instead to the subject that senses a THIS or NOW, as if to fixate in the mediator what was so elusive in the object being mediated. Though the focus has changed in this approach, in the new dialectic of the subject we once again experience sense-certainty's inability to communicate once stripped of its conceptual framewor...
