k. In this case the failure of NOW and THIS is replaced by the failure of 'I' which, intended as a particular, can instead only function as a universal reference to all 'I's. Just as in the dialectic of the object, sense-certainty as the realm of raw being or unmediated sensual experience cannot differentiate this 'I' from another 'I' without using the more complex, (and therefore off-limits), construction of "this 'I' as differentiated from all other 'I's". Instead of a meaningful reference to a particular subject that has experienced the original object in question, we are left with the universal case of 'I'NESS, which is of no use in apprehending the identity of the subject which might have knowledge of the object of sensual experience.Having experienced the dead-ends found in the both dialectic of the object and the subject, Hegel's final attempt to ascertain the potential of sense certainty is to unify these two attempts, approaching the issue as a dialectic of the totality of subject and object. Initially, this approach solves the problems found in the first two dialectical stages in that the totality is no longer concerned with other HERES, THISES or 'I's, since in the totality each THIS or HERE is directly linked to a specific I and vice versa. This is what Hegel means by calling the totality "self identical." (104) Owing to this nature of self-identification, we now must treat the totality as one instance, a treatment that Hegel suggests could be made through a moment of ostension or pointing.In the moment of ostension, however, sense-certainty's inability to utilize a complex framework of meaning once again dooms it to communicating only the most vacuous or general knowledge about what is in reality a particular experience. Hegel breaks this third and final failure into two pieces and, though his construction is more complex than in the first two dialectics, there remains a strong similarity to the failures of stage one and tw...
