elf. His final argument is simply that when pleasure is added to any other good, e.g. to just or temperate action, it makes that good more choiceworthy; and good is increased by the addition of itself.(1172b20-25). Aristotle sees the third argument placing pleasure as one good among others, and being no more or less good than any other. And he is correct in saying that the addition of any good to any other good makes it more choiceworthy. He then cites the opinion of Plato who argued that the pleasant life is more choiceworthy when combined with intelligence than it is without it; and if the mixed [good] is better, pleasure is not the good, since nothing can be added to the good to make is more choiceworthy(1172b30). This seems true enough; that if one was to find the good, there would be no other qualities that could make it more good, because by definition it is the good of all goods.At 1173a he explains that there is no sound argument that proves that pleasure is not a good. This leads into the Aristotles reply for the first two arguments that Eudoxus gave. When there are opinions that object to the idea that what everything aims at is not good, there must be credence given to that argument. If things were called good by all then it would seem that they are good. He then says that if both intelligent beings and beings without understanding follow this claim, how can there be anything in it? He also presumes that even in the inferior animals that there is something that seeks its own proper good that is superior to them.The argument against Eudoxus about pain also seems to be incorrect (1173b8). It is argued that if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good. The general point of the objection is correct, but what is said in the case that is mentioned is false. If pleasure and pain are evils, both would need to be avoided, and if both were neutral they would either have to be avoided completely or equally...
