. Since pain is avoided as evil and pleasure is pursued as good, this must then be an opposition between them. Before Aristotle continues on how to define the status of pleasure, at 1173a18, he says that if pleasure is not a quality it does not follow that it is not a good. Neither are virtuous activities or happiness qualities.The good is defined as definite, and pleasure is indefinite. It is indefinite because it allows for degrees of more or less. If it is the state of being pleased that is called definite, then it must also hold true for conditions like justice and the other virtues, Aristotle explains before. Certain characters can be seen as more and less and virtues can be explained similarly. If the judgement of pleasure rests on the variety of the pleasures that there are, then the reason of the admittance of degrees is ignored. Some pleasures are pure while others are mixed with pain. Aristotle mentions next that health allows for a variance of degrees even though it itself is definite. So he asks, why should pleasure not be the same? (1173a25)Pleasure is not definite then because of the varying degrees. It is then stated that it is also not a process because the good is complete and are processes and becomings are, by definition, incomplete. But pleasure cannot fit even into the category of a process. 1773a 30, Aristotle says that pleasures are not quick or slow, for quickness and slowness seems to be proper to every process-if not in itself, then in relation to something else. But neither of these is true with pleasure. While it is as possible to become pleased quickly as to any other emotion, it is not possible to be pleased quickly (1173b1). Though the Greek and English are obviously different, as an English translation, following the proper rules of grammar, one cannot, be an adverb.Aristotle then explains how the relation of pleasure to pain cannot be used for a process. Continue from his previous though...
