of which a machine makes use. Bridgeman will go so far as to suggest that intentionality is a cognitive illusion and that consciousness is a neurological system like any other, with functions such as the long-term direction of behavior (intentionality?), access to long-term memories, and othersthat make ita processor of biologically useful information. Perhaps the focus here should not be that humans and machines are hopelessly differentiated, but that programs, being designed without extensive evolution, have more restricted goals and motivations. This condition, however, does not limit the possibility of computers making plans and achieving goals.John Eccles of Switzerland also provides a commentary on Searles argument with which he has a few basic problems, but also finds a wealth of accurate observations. As far as Searles proposition that intentionality is a product of causal features of the brain, Eccles, being a dualist-interactionist, feels that intentionality is a property of the self-conscious mind, the brain being used as an instrument in the realization of intentions. Eccles will go so far as to support Searle completely if intentionality is forsaken as a property of the brain. This will then be an appropriately strong and rational argument against artificial intelligence. He feels the intrinsic flaw in all of AI can be demonstrated by Premacks experiments regarding the chimp Sarah. Sarah was taught to use certain symbols that represented human language. Premack felt that Sarah was learning a simplistic level of language. This same system was taught by an experimenter, Lenneberg who challenged the notion, to high school students, and although the error percentage decreased, when asked what they were doing, the students were not able to identify it as a symbolic representation of English. This shows that in either case, there was no understanding being produced, in other words a version of the Chinese room. In Ec...
