cles own words the accomplishments of a computer program are no more than a triumph for the computer designer in simulation. The only other problem Eccles has with Searles argument is Searles criticism of the mind is to brain as program is to hardware. He especially criticizes the statement of Searle that the mind is a product of the brain relying on biological processes. As a dualist, this is not acceptable to Eccles. Overall, Eccles feels it was high time that strong AI was discredited.Much like Searle, I myself have found the computational paradigm to be fraught with overestimations and unqualified legitimacies. I do not personally embrace all of Searles dogmas, I feel his argument and rebuttal fail to address certain important issues, such as what is the exact appropriate causal powers that he speaks so often of? At no point does Searle exactly state what this is to suggest to the reader. Actually, the failure to properly identify certain key notions and verbiage throughout cognitive science is a trend. The very concepts of intentionality and understanding remain vague and poorly defined. The question, or so I have gathered here, is do computers have the ability or possibility to understand in the sense of human cognition? Well, first we must come up with a certain and exact definition of understanding. It has been suggested to me by fellow peers and through discussion that understanding must consist of three important points. 1) Symbols that represent concepts and items of the environment. 2) A means of referring these symbols to the things that they represent. 3) Rules for manipulating and forming symbols in new and complex ways. All three of these notions I can accept as being pertinent and necessary to the discussion of understanding, but I must confess I find it to be still short of the qualities of understanding. In order to further expound on this definition, I must elucidate what I feel is the strongest of...
