tions insofar as each has a positive function. 10. I have emphasized the practical similarity of these concepts. For a more detailed theoretical analysis that emphasizes their differences, see "Spinoza and Nietzsche: *Amor dei* and *Amor fati*" in Volume Two of Yeimiyahu Yovel's *Spinoza and Other Heretics*, Princton Univ. Press, 1989. 11. What many find unacceptable in Christian thought (or at least in some, not insignificant, strands of it) is that 1) In the name of piety, attempts are made to limit freedom of speech and thought; 2) the body, and the temporal order in general, is disparaged as intrinsically flawed or evil; 3) it is demanded that one accept mythic and religious imagery as scientific/historical explanations of phenomena; 4) various prevailing cultural norms are accepted as absolute moral imperatives, not subject to rational criticism; and 5) particular texts are idolatrously accepted as the essential foundation rather than the creative expression of religious faith. 12. I came across this definition of "myth" in a Jungian analysis of medieval romance, the title and author of which escapes me at the moment. 13. I am merely asserting the last of these three "theoretical advantages" and do not attempt to defend it explicitly in this paper. 14. At this point, I feel somewhat like Paul, whose gospel was, to the Jew, "a stumbling block," and to the Greek, "foolishness." "Orthodox" Christians imagine (understandably) that the legitimacy of their faith depends on the historical truth of the gospel narratives. They stumble at the notion that countless millions, past and present, have had a similar experience of faith and salvation--people who never heard the name of Christ, or have rejected the name because of that which they associate with it; people who, despite their ignorance of Jesus of Nazareth, or their repugnance to traditional Christianity, may, nonetheless, know Christ--in the Spirit, as it were--just as intimately as ...
