to exist, even in their misery, confirms that existence is the greatest boon (3.7.20). Indeed, he argues that the suicidal person's desire for death actually reflects a desire for rest, not the desire for non-existence (3.8.23). All this is highly interesting and very relevant to those who are determined to come to terms with themselves and with God. Nevertheless, it would be an understatement to say that it does not conclusively demonstrate that the origin of every aspect of creation--including those wills which are called evil and those creatures which are eternally damned--should not ultimately be attributed to the will of God. Augustine senses this, but can only assert that while the human *ability* to sin--together with the *possibility* of experiencing the misery that accompanies sin)--is necessary to the perfection of the universe, actual sin and actual misery are not (3.9.26). These assertions are correlative with second and third approaches presented above--the former with his position that the imperfection of any part of creation disappears in light of the perfection of the whole; and the latter with his insistence that the origin of moral evil, together with that suffering which is construed as punishment for sin, is to be found in the free choice of the will of rational creatures. But consistent with the first approach--evil as a privation--Augustine seems to be saying that inasmuch as condemned souls are constituted by their evil wills, for which no cause is to be found outside of their own freedom, they are in fact *nothing*. Nevertheless, insofar as they actually *are*--existing eternally as immortal souls, however defective-- they must be considered good and we may attribute their origin to the divine will. If, however, we ask why God, in his omnipotence, chose to create beings with the ability to choose eternal self- destruction, Augustine can only a assert that creation is more perfect by virtue of these seeming imper...
