fections--i.e. the *ability* to sin, together with the *possibility* of experiencing the misery that accompanies it (3.9.26). Thus, it seems that Augustine, in the final analysis, depends more heavily on the first and second approach, the appeal to the free choice of the will failing ultimately to eliminate the problem. Having considered Augustine's approach to our problem, we are now in position to articulate clearly what is at stake. The real *problem* in the problem of evil--the core of it, as it were--is that granting God's omnipotence, there seems to be no way to avoid the conclusion that God finds the perdition of an indefinite number of human souls acceptable in light of the greater good which their perdition makes possible. Thus, even if we grant that, it makes sense to talk of a rational creature freely choosing its own perdition, and even if we hypothesize that God has in some sense limited his power with a view to creating more glorious creatures by virtue of their free will,{2} it is nevertheless the case, according to the tradition, 1) that, in the light of his eternal existence, God knows the end from the beginning; and 2) that he had no need to create; and even if he chose to create, he might have created differently. As such, we cannot avoid placing full responsibility for existence--including every aspect of human experience, whether in this life or the next--squarely on God's shoulders. Let us admit that when we bow before God, it is not because his "justice" has been demonstrated to us. It would seem more reasonable to say that we bow before his power. It is pointless to try and defend God against those who cry foul. A more fruitful approach, as we shall see, is to understand why we ought, indeed, to bow before his power.{3} Rather than attempting to *justify the ways of God to man*, let us show those who would *reply against God* the foolishness of their objections, admonishing them, in the Spirit of Augustine, to gi...
