cism would be of Newell and Simon's hypothesis. Their use the term "necessary" I feel is wrong. They take it to mean that any system that exhibits general intelligence will turn out to be a physical symbol system. I believe that it is unfair to make this claim. There are two plausible theories that I am aware of that do not use symbols, governed in accordance with rules or processes, that rely on descreate-state machines, to ascribe general intelligence. The first of these theories is the theory of dynamical systems. Dynamical systems are not symbol manipulators. They do not use programs to arrive at ends but instead use deferential equations. They do not operate by sequential steps but instead operate in "real" time. I believe that dynamical systems (although they not without their own problems) are at least an equally plausible theory for describing intelligent action. What I would like to make clear here is that, I do not believe that dynamical systems are necessarily better than physical symbol systems, but that Newell and Simon might not be correct in saying that all intelligent action is explained by their theory alone.The second theory I wish to propose in opposition to Newell and Simon is the connectionist theory. This theory I feel much more strongly about and is very different then a dynamical system. If we are going to attempt to describe human like intelligent action or just intelligent action in general, I believe that it is much more realistic and logical to create a system that mimics brains. A connectionist theory is based on how the brain works. Newell and Simon have used a digital frame work, such as a digital computer, to rest their theory on. The connectionist theory does not do this. It uses the architecture of the brain to manipulate procedures and algorithms. Where Newell and Simon use a digital method a connectionist system uses a quantitative one. This is the part of the theory that I believe Ne...
