Hume's Argument on the Distinction Benevolence & Self-love In his Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, Hume rebukes the arguments of skeptical, philosophers who deny the existence of moral distinctions. He doubts that an individual can be so indifferent that he or she is unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Hume believes that the differences between men arise from nature, from habit, and from education. Hume believes no skeptic, no matter how doubtful, can claim that there are absolutely no moral distinctions. Also, he accepts if we disregard these skeptics, we find that they eventually give up their unconvincing claims and come over to the side of common sense and reason. In this paper, it will be shown that ultimately Hume maintains that benevolence is not the basis for self-love, rather it focuses on the utility to please, and the need for benevolence for its own sake.The particular instances on which Hume first focuses are those relating to two social virtues: benevolence and justice. It is obvious, he says, that our benevolent qualities are important. To say of a person that he or she is sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, is to 'express the highest merit, which human nature is capable of attaining'(29). It is equally apparent, he suggests, that these qualities are esteemed because they proved for, "the happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support of friendsover the breasts of men"(34). The usefulness of these forms of benevolence is an essential condition of the attention we give to them, a inference that is understood, once morals acts of a particular type cease to be useful, they cease to be valued (30-32). In addition, he shows that this set of morals, which converts all human society into self-love. Hume does not argue about benevolence or self-love, which dominate human nature; a dispute, which, as he justly observes, is never ...
