likely to have any issue, both because society is not easily convinced, and because the issue, which can be caused on either side, are so uncertain, and subject to such a variety of interpretations, that it is impossible accurately to compare them. He thinks it is sufficient for his purpose, that there is some benevolence, however small, instilled into our heart; some amount of friendship for human kind:"Let these generous sentiments, says he, be supposed ever so weak; let them be hardly sufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they must still direct the determinations of the mind, and where every thing else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A moral distinction, therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation; {11} a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable aversion to those of the other"(72). Hume goes on to ask, why utility pleases; why is it that we admire those qualities that are beneficial to society? Before answering this question he notes that it does not concern inanimate objects. We obviously find many such objects to be useful, but that is no reason to suppose that we are call them virtuous, nor do we, except in immoral ways, attribute virtues to them(62-64). Those opinions directed towards rational beings' include esteem or approbation, while the sentiments directed towards mere things are clearly not the same. Hume's' concern, then, is with our approbation of those human acts that benefit (or harm) man and society (66-67).Hume supposes that two answers have been given to his question: why does utility please? Some have said that acts useful to society receive our approbation only because, we see them as benefiting ourselves personally. Others believe that these acts receive our approbation on some or even many occasions because, although they give us no personal ben...
