efit, they are recognized as beneficial to others. Hume again aligns himself with the second group. He grants that human nature is marked by a strong tendency towards self-interest, and that the claim that we support the principles of morality and social order out of self-love or private regard has some truth, but he goes on to argue that the selfish theory is quite unable to account for crucial aspects of our experience, and hence cannot be correct(78-79).Hume's final point concerning benevolence in the Enquiry is his description of personal merit that he has completed. Humans are not entirely selfish creatures there is some benevolence, however small, instilled in our hearts(67). These benevolent doctrines, however weak they may be, are sufficiently strong to lead us to prefer that which is "useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous"(72). Hume affirms that moral distinctions are contrived for the purpose that we have the predilection to benefit human society. The presence of this sentiment means that we respond with approval or disapproval to certain actions or qualities that we experience others to have. Hume agrees that there are genuine and significant differences between characters and the actions resulting from them. Some are beneficial to mankind, and some are baneful. These are actions we react with approval or disapproval, and thus we create moral distinctions, and call actions assisting the public morally good and those leaning toward evil morals....
