s guilt. Assuming that the anonymity instruction signals the jury that the defendants might "get" to them, critics of anonymous juries ignore a likely consequence of that perception.26 A juror who anticipates a defendant's retaliation would be more likely to return a guilty verdict despite such fears rather than because of them. Thus, even if anonymity incidentally instills the fear it attempts to remedy, the result arguably benefits the defendant by making jurors afraid to convict. On the other hand, if anonymity helps to remedy existing fears, it serves the ideal of dispassionate judgement. Although a defendant would understandably welcome a trial before a jury biased toward an acquittal, the people, as well as the defendant, are entitled to an impartial jury. Of course, a juror may interpret anonymity as a measure designed only to prevent jury tampering, not as a measure protecting him from a violent defendant. The question then becomes whether this inference pre-judicially alters the juror's perception of a defendant. Whether jurors perceive their anonymity as a measure designed to prevent tampering or violence, it does little to alter their perception of certain defendants, since most qualified jurors have some pretrial impressions or opinions of merits of important, publicized cases. Nevertheless, the courts have consistently held that jurors need not be completely oblivious to the facts underlying a particular case.27 Pretrial impressions or opinions will not disqualify a juror if, in the court's judgement, he can set aside such impressions and base his decision solely on the evidence admitted at trial. While a juror's ability to ignore pervasive media coverage may be questionable, critics of anonymous juries seem presume that jurors are oblivious to the nature of these cases until they are directed not to reveal their identities.28 Only then, supposedly, are their minds irrevocaably po...
