isoned against the defendants. By instructing a jury that anonymity prevents the media and interested members of the public from interfering with their deliberations, a trial judge avoids most prejudicial innuendo. Con- sequently, an anonymous jury does not undermine the presumption of innocence. The Use of Anonymous Juries Although the prejudicial impact of juror anonymity may be exaggerated, any intrusion on a defendant's fair trial rights is unjustified if anonymity is unecessary. The need for anonymous juries rests on several grounds. Juror anonymity rests on the assumption that at least some jurors will be intimidated by the characterzation of the defendants in the indictment and the corresponding pretrial media attention. Critics complain that judges have imposed anonymity without an indication from jurors that they were afraid.29 Although juror fear may be difficult to prove, aassuming its existence is not as specious as this criticism suggests. First, the impracticality of judicial inquiry into this area is obvious. If the jurors are not already apprehensive, extensive questioning about such fears would certainly tend to generate the fear the questions are designed to detect. Second, while no juror expressed any fear of violence on the record in Barnes and its progency, jurors have voiced such fears in cases involving less notorious defendants. Most of the current cases using anonymous juries involve powerful organized crime groups whose public reputations for corruption, intimidation, and ruthlessness have become matters of contemporary wisdom. Another premise underlying the need for anonymous juries is that certain defendants or their sympathizers are likely to corrupt or intimidate the jury. Critics assert that courts accept this premise despite a "total absence of any evidence of jury tampering, or of a conspiracy to tamper, injure, or otherwise adversely affec...
