d always be there to defend the country. This attitude established the groundwork for the stagnation of the external defense capability of the AFP. Department of Defense and AFP officials have called attention to the weak capacity of the AFP to defend the country against external threats, including intrusions by smugglers and illegal fishermen. Philippine Navy statistics show that between 1986 and October 1990, there were 819 incidents of illegal incursions involving 1,617 Taiwanese vessels. Only a few of these were actually apprehended. Philippine Air Force records also show that there were 231 incursions into the Philippine Air Defense Identification Zone (PADIZ) made by non-friendly aircraft in the same period. The neglect of the external defense capability of the AFP has bred political repercussions. A fact-finding commission report showed that it was partly responsible for demoralization within the AFP and, indirectly, is one of the causes of the series of coup d’ etat that have taken place in the country. This dependency on the U.S assistance has another aspect to it. Aside from external security, the Philippines have also relied on the United States for assistance in the development of the AFP’s internal capabilities. National concerns relating to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and recently the military renegades of the RAM-KSP focused these development efforts on the counter-insurgency and the Philippine Army. As a result of U.S. assistance, AFP gains in the field and joint negotiations diminished the threat that these groups posed. As an example, the CPP-NPA has had its regular forces reduced from 25,200 in 1987, to 13,500 by 1992, infiltrating only 18% (down from up to 26% a year before) of the barangays (local villages). The insurgency, however, had proven resilient in the past and remains a major threat to the stability of the state.The focus ...
