on the insurgency, however, and the capability of the AFP to fight it also had its long-term consequences. The external defense capabilities of the AFP were neglected and the Philippine Navy and Air Force, the services reared for external security, amounted to almost nothing when dealing with external defense. As a result, theses two services are also the most affected by the fallout from the U.S. withdrawal.The Philippine Navy has 21 patrol ships, 22 transport and service vessels, and about 64 small craft with an average of 41 years in service to protect the country’s 1.29 million square kilometers of territorial waters and its 1.69 million square miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). It is the only naval force in the ASEAN region without any missile capability. Many of the Philippine Navy’s ships have limited patrol radius and are not even considered seaworthy. The termination of the MBA puts it on more uncertain footing since 28% of its operational requirements were within the bases compensation package. The Philippines Air Force (PAF) is in an even worse state, having relied on the United States for as much as 61% of its operational needs. The PAF retired its aging F-5A fighters from service in 1992, leaving the country with virtually no air defense. Modernization plans for the AFP are being held back by financial shortages. The AFP is trying to appropriate funds for a 10-year modernization program costing US$7 billion. The program banked on American military assistance when it was initiated in 1990, but when the bases withdrew these funds were reduced drastically. The only alternative has been U.S foreign grants and loans that require the recipients provide counterpart funds. In 1992 it was reported that as much as 63% of the PAP fund’s pledged US$5.8 Billion in 1989 and 1991 remain unused because of the unavailability of such counterpart funding. The Philippines-U.S. security relationship remains in...
