ters can imitate the mind in many ways, "they cannot do some of the things that almost all human beings can do, especially those flights of fancy, those insights attained without antecedent logical thought, those innovative yet nonrational leaps of the mind." In fact, Adler makes a direct rebuttal against the theoretical viewpoint of Newell and Simon with his claim "that the brain is only a necessary, but not the sufficient, condition of conceptual thought, and that an immaterial intellect as a component of the human mind is required in addition to the brain as a necessary condition." There are many other elements of the human mind that are currently inapplicable to computers. For example, computers are incapable of utilizing what Dreyfus and Dreyfus refer to as "everyday know-how." By this, the Dreyfus brothers "do not mean procedural rules but knowing what to do in a vast number of special cases." The Dreyfus brothers also note that computers lack the ability to generalize, as well as the ability to learn from their own experiences. In order for a machine to be truly intelligent, "it must be able to generalize; that is, given sufficient examples of inputs associated with one particular output, it should associate further inputs of the same type with that same output." Hilary Putnam points out that true human intelligence requires more than the manipulation of codes and symbols. Thus, "to figure out what is the information implicit in the things people say, the machine must simulate understanding a human language." Again, this is something that is currently missing in computer technology. Furthermore, it is a thing that may never be achievable. In this regard, Putnam refers to the research of the linguist Noam Chomsky, who discovered that there might be a "template for natural language" within the human mind. This "template," which enables people to learn languages, may be at least partially innate, or "hard-wired-in,"...
