ion of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination anda violation of the prophylactic rules in Miranda. The Court stated that the FifthAmendment was drafted in order to guard against genuine compulsion, which involves anelement of coercion. The police in Tucker did not coerce the defendant to make thestatement and, therefore, did not violate his Fifth Amendment right against compelledself-incrimination. The police did, however, violate the rules of the Miranda decision. TheTucker Court made clear that Miranda warnings are not, themselves, rights protected bythe Constitution, but are merely measures formulated by the Court to ensure that the rightagainst compelled self-incrimination is protected (Online).In Oregon v. Elstad, the Supreme Court ruled that when a suspect makes avoluntary statement without being advised of his Miranda warnings, the Fifth AmendmentSelf-Incrimination Clause does not require the suppression of a subsequent statementmade by that suspect, provided that the police comply with Miranda when taking thesecond statement. In Elstad, the police arrested the defendant, Michael Elstad, forburglary. When one of the officers sat down with Elstad to explain that he thought Elstadwas involved in the burglary, Elstad responded by saying, "Yes, I was there." The policedid not advise Elstad of his Miranda warnings until after he had been transported to thesheriff's department, 1 hour later. He then waived his Miranda rights and confessed to theburglary. The Court suppressed the first statement because police took it in violation ofMiranda. Elstad claimed that because he had "let the cat out of the bag" during the firstunwarned interrogation, the second statement also should be suppressed. He argued thatthe second statement was the tainted fruit of the poisonous tree, because his priorunwarned statement exerted a coercive impact on his later admissions and that theMiranda warnings did not purge that taint. Su...
