preme Court precedent has established that aprior coerced statement may result in the suppression of a subsequent statement, if it isdetermined that the coercive influence of the first statement carried over to the secondstatement. In Elstad, however, the Supreme Court ruled that "the failure of police toadminister Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements received have actuallybeen coerced..." (Online, 9)The Court distinguished between voluntary unwarned admissions and statementsthat result from actual police coercion. This distinction highlighted the Supreme Court'sapparent abandonment of the Miranda doctrine that custodial interrogations are inherentlycoercive. The Court viewed Elstad's first statement as having resulted from a noncoerciveMiranda violation rather than a constitutional violation. The Elstad Court made it clearthat where there is a noncoercive Miranda violation, the remedy is limited to thesuppression of the unwarned statement. A voluntary statement taken in violation ofMiranda does not carry with it any taint that would affect the admissibility of evidencederived from that statement (Online, 9).The Supreme Court has practically abandoned the underlying principle of theMiranda decision, that custodial police interrogation is inherently coercive, and has carvedout many exceptions to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Consequently, a violation of theMiranda ruling does not necessarily mean that the resulting statement will be inadmissible.The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Miranda warnings are not constitutionallyrequired but are only prophylactic rules designed to protect a suspect's right againstcompelled self-incrimination. Voluntariness remains the constitutional standard that mustbe met when obtaining a statement from a suspect. Nonetheless, law enforcementagencies should consult with legal counsel to ensure that investigative practices conformto the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in M...
