wer's authorization for a quick resolution to the crisis in Iran by “whatever means necessary“ (Gavin, 1999, p.68). This stance was a change from the new Republican administration, which took office in late January 1953. The two presidencies differed remarkably by its estimation of the crisis. Truman and Acheson were eager to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, but Eisenhower and Dulles viewed the situation strictly in Cold War terms. They both harbored strong fears about the spread of Communism, which was the climate of the early 1950’s (Gavin, 1999, p.70). Also, John Dulles also had a personal concern in this matter. He considered it one of the major problems facing the administration and not because it wasn't merely a matter of oil. There was plenty of oil coming from other sources to the U.S. The problem was what would happen to Iran without the oil revenue. If Iran should become bankrupt and go into chaos the whole Middle East would be in danger which would in turn effect the U.S. economy and numerous other aspects (Gavin, 1999, p.71-72).In light of this mindset a top secret meeting was quickly convened at the White House between President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Ambassador Aldrich. In response to recent events, the President mentioned that if the present oil negotiations failed, he would want to find a new approach to the Persian oil problem. He could not sit still and do nothing in such a situation. What Eisenhower's statement essentially amounted to was a “green light” to proceed with covert action in Iran (Risen, 2000, p.10).Finally, in June of 1953 United State’s C.I.A. agents along with British M16 agents began to assemble their plot to overthrow Mossadegh. Their plan was known as “Operation Ajax” (United States, 1980, p.588). There were many intricate parts i...
