n the U.S.’s intervention plan. The first and largest of which was to the recruitment of numerous Iranian businessmen with powerful connections in the Majlis, military, and clergy. These men organized pro-Shah and pro-Western street gangs on the day of the takeover (Moasddel, 1989, p.16). The second was a simple straight forward part. After severing all phone lines at Mossadegh’s home, a mixture of American, British, and Iranian forces surrounded his home with one tank, four trucks, two jeeps, an armored car, and 60 soldiers (all who were Iranian). They arrested Mossadegh and his guards within minutes (Moyara de Moraes, 1993, 467). There were no death or injuries as a result of the arrest Roosevelt, 1972, p.83). We must be remembered that this feat could not have been accomplished without the complicity of numerous Iranian citizens. It was after all a United States organized operation, but Iranian army conducted a large majority of the physical actions involved (Moyara de Moraes, 1993, p.467). Furthermore, this coup could not have come about in the absence of already widespread dissatisfaction with Mossadegh (Faller, 1996, p.16).Looking back a specifically American actions in Iran we can see no sign of a war by any standard. When we look at the standards for war, as described by Bruce Russett, he mentions that a war is a conflict with more than a thousand battle deaths (Russett, 1999, p.70). There was not one death caused directly by American soldiers or civilians (Risen, 2000, p.467). Moreover, less than half the soldiers in Iran were American. There was a hybrid of forces during the coup (Faller, 1996, p.16). Taking in all this we must conclude that United States intervention in Iran did not meet the definition for war as described in the democratic peace theory. For the democratic peace theory to work, both countries must be legitimate liberal democracies. We come to the question if Mossadegh regime was a ...
