dy to change their strategies. The other fighting powers, despite the popular attraction of the theory of the knock-out blow from air, remained skeptical and never seriously contemplated a strategic bomber campaign designed to do what armies and navies had done hitherto. (Goyer 34). In the end however, neither the British nor the American supporters of bombing could provide convincing evidence that the war in Europe could be ended from air. In the pacific the bombers had a better case since Japans economy was weaker and its air resistance was much worse. Using aircraft to bomb Japan seemed a wise strategy because the bombings would avoid the needless loss of life that an invasion of the Japanese mainland would produce. Yet the American defeat of Japan was a combined operation in every sense, naval power cleverly combined with air power helped to back up and protect the long haul of the American armies into the Japans land. Only when bases sufficiently close to Japan had been taken could the bombings come on its own, and only the use of the atomic bomb, which air commanders could not have counted on when making their original plans, brought the war to an end, with the effectiveness of bombing debate unresolved.It is obvious that air war raises more questions than its place in military strategy. One of the most significant things about air warfare was its close link with a certain level of economic and technical achievement. Only the most advanced industrial powers could afford to run a large air force and undertake the research and development necessary to maintain the technological force associated with such an advanced weapons systems. For this reason the ability to wage a successful war in the air did not depend just on the heroism and determination of pilots or the tactical encouragement of air force leaders, but to a large extent on economic and technical fa...
