ctors. As the Germans were to discover in Russia and the Japanese in the Pacific, quality could not forever make up for in adequate provision of aircraft from the factories. (overy 254) Later on quantity became a factor capable of achieving domination in the air. Therefore aircraft production assumed a great importance in the warring economics and became a real test of how successfully modern industrial economies could be converted into war purposes. The Germans and Japanese economies were evidently less successful than those of the Allies. Aircraft production rose to great heights in Germany and Japan in 1944 when it could be used with very much less effect. Had both countries been able to produce what was demanded from an early stage of war, when its provision might have proved influential, then they would have posed a very much greater military threat in 1941 and 1942. Both in Germany and Japan great plans were laid for aircraft output, but problems arose between the plan and fulfillment. The explanation for lies in the way in that war economies were control, which for political and economic reasons could not be solved until the war was well under way. (Jablonski 212). Whether these difficulties have been over come or still remain the problem of an overwhelming economic advantage to the Allies. It was at this point that the question of research and development became so important. The superiority gained through quantity depended on the average performance of aircraft on both sides being more or less similar. A real major shift in quality, such as that implied with the jet aircraft or rockets, might in itself have led to a shift in the balance of air power. Hence the powers had to be prepared not only to produce large quantities of aircraft, but at the same time to assure the maintenance of at least an approximate technical parody. The 1935 to 1945 period saw a rapidly accelerating rate of techni...
