sia is, and should be, filled with emotion.Maguire acknowledges the argument that acceptance of the practice of euthanasia could lead society down the path toward the "mass murder of physically and mentally defective persons" (p. 449). He argues, however, that the specific case under examination is "drastic," and our behavior in a "drastic" case cannot be generalized to our behavior in normal situations. In fact, if we keep that particular defective child alive, then we are defining our terms wrongly. We are committing the "error of interpreting the sanctity of life in merely physical terms" (p. 449). First, he uses the example of a fetus, which is not yet a person, but which is capable of becoming a person. This image is followed by a transition, at the end of the tenth paragraph, to his next idea, which is that life might sometimes "be terminated when other sacred values outweigh its claims to life in a conflict situation" (p. 449). Maguire's idea of the correct definition of "the sanctity of life," in the eleventh paragraph, is a "generic notion" that fails to take account of "sacred human dignity," and he proposes that "the sanctity of death might here take precedence over a physicalist interpretation of the sanctity of life" (pp. 449-450). In other words, he is offering new terms that reverse the old terminology. The terminology is central to his argument.As soon as we replace Maguire's terms with simpler words, his argument begins to fall apart. For example, if we replace "termination of life" with the simpler term, "death," a chill fills the space once occupied by the more neutral, more technical term. Termination of life is scientific, clinical, and easy. Death, on the other hand, is cold, frightening, and difficult. In at least every third paragraph, Maguire reminds the reader that he is putting off the question of who should make the decision. He is only arguing that, in some cases, termination of life is more mor...
