ally acceptable than prolonging life. Using another example, Maguire argues, "The decision to let live is not inherently safe" (p. 451). However, his terminology is deceptive--"safe" is not the same kind of term as "moral." Often, the morally right course of action is not safe. For example, if I do not murder my neighbor, then tomorrow my neighbor might murder me, especially if we do not like each other. But my possible future safety does not make it right for me to murder my neighbor. This kind of thinking, in terms of safety, can lead to vigilante actions, such as lynching.Perhaps some people do not forgive others for letting them live. Perhaps they do not feel that they have the freedom to commit suicide, but they do not have a right to demand that someone else commit murder, just to relive them of the responsibility of making their own life-and-death decisions. Maguire talks about risk, but there is no such thing as life without risk. Anyone can suddenly become ill, or get into an automobile accident, or simply grow old. In addition, perfectly normal, healthy people sometimes live in misery, poverty, and want. Should they be offered "termination of life" as a moral alternative? Maguire keeps avoiding the real question: Who is to decide when death is better than life? Maguire never answers the all important question: Who should decide? He simply holds that, in certain drastic situations, "the imposition of death would seem a good" (p. 452). John Leo does not use a neutral term, such as "termination of life." He uses the legal term, "homicide." To point out the dangers of accepting the practice of euthanasia, Leo uses the example of the Netherlands, where, he says, "euthanasia is positioned as a socially approved crime that requires some sort of vague pro forma public airing" (p. 462). His transition to the next stage of his argument is that "this airing is usually nonexistent. Most killings go unreported and uninv...
