n as a full dialogue partner and was subsequently granted that status. China-ASEAN cooperation culminated in 1997 when the first China-ASEAN Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur. President Jiang Zheming proclaimed that the meeting "marks the beginning of a new stage of development in Chinese-ASEAN relations" (J. Wang p. 85). These Summits have gradually evolved from covering only economic issues to security issues, including 'promotion of confidence building measures, peacekeeping, maritime search and rescue, preventive diplomacy, nonproliferation and even sensitive topics such as the South China Sea' (Wang p. 85). It is important to note that China makes a careful distinction between formal multilateral security mechanisms and unofficial security discussions. In general, China is extremely hesitant about the former but supports the latter. This tendency results from the Chinese assertion that national sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters should be the 'highest principles of international relations' (J. Wang p. 92). China is only willing to support multilateralism to the extent that this principle is reconcilable with their actions. Therefore Beijing supports multilateral organizations such as the ARF, APEC, UN Collective Security, and ASEAN being characterized by weak institutionalization and informal dialogue rather than formal institutionalized regimes. Collective security should not resort to military action, but should instead act as a supplement to political solutions (J. Wang p.92). However, China is not willing to sacrifice its international image in defending this principle. Beijing has refrained from using its UN Security Council veto to impede multilateral security forces in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Rwanda because it does not want to be see as an obstructionist (J. Wang p. 80) and and thereby tainting its image in the U...
