N. This raises the question whether China's new embrace of multilateralism is based just on a tactical adjustment (policy adaptation Hu p. 121) or is actually rooted in deeper perception shifts (learning p. 121). The lines defining these two terms are sometimes blurry but generally, a tactical shift would be if China simply saw multilateralism as a tool to gain advantages while learning would be characterized by a major shift in 'world outlook' (Hu p. 121) resulting in a genuine appreciation for multilateralism. There is evidence to support either assertions. On one hand, it seems that Beijing has developed a genuine appreciation for multilateralism as demonstrated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty issue. China has realized that nuclear proliferation threatens world and national security (Hu p. 121). Consequently, the pursuit of egalitarianism in international relations is not worth this risk. Beijing has shifted from opposing the Non-Proliferation Treaty to genuinely supporting its cause. However, it seems that the majority of China's new involvement in multilateralism results from Beijing's desire to balance US bilateralism with Japan (Christensen p. 248) and the need to ease the transition into a global power by allaying its neighbors fears. Yong Deng argues that China sees growing multilateral networks through a "state-centric prism, focusing only on how China could take advantage of these new 'external environments' to protect and maximize its national interests (Deng p. 52). In that case, China has not really undergone any fundamental change in perceptions but rather just a tactical shift (Christensen p. 248). Instead, bilateral relations remain the default. There are several reasons that account for this tendency. First, China has not had a positive experience with multilateral diplomacy because it was of the first targets of...
