o-based "East European source in September 1984) that the Soviet Union proposed (in the spring of 1984) a 5-point package of military cooperation to Pyongyang. The five points were: (1) a training in modern warfare for North Korean officers in the Soviet Union; (2) stationing in the North of a Soviet military advisory group; (3) the standardization of Soviet-North Korean 'tactics' and 'weapons'; (4) Soviet naval access to Wonsan; (5) and $200 million worth of Soviet economic aid, conditioned on Pyongyang's acceptance of the above. North Korea is reported to have accepted (1), rejected (2), said "depends on future developments" to (3) and refused Wonsan (offering instead Najin). See Akira Kuni, n,Change,in North Korea: Direction in Post-1984 Developments," Kaigai Jijo [Tokyo], No.6, 1989, pp.29-30. [In Japanese] 8 For an in-depth analysis of Kim Jong Il's "political entanglements" relating to the KPA, see Masayuki Suzuki, North Korea: Vying for Socialism and Tradition. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1992, pp.111-117. [In Japanese] 9 Paul Ensor, "Pyongyang's Military: A State of Perpetual Alert," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 2,1984, p.26. 10 Kim Kyong-joon, "The Role of the Military in North Korea's Foreign Relations," Vantage Point [Seoul], April 1933, pp.10-11, 11 For an in-depth discussion on Pyongyang's nuclear program, see Congressional Research Service. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program. By Larry A. Niksch. CRS Issue Brief IB91141. Continually Updated. 12 The Asia Society, The Current Situation on the Korean Peninsula. New York: The Asia Society, 1991, p.7. 13 According to reports compiled by East European and Russian diplomats in Pyongyang, the North's GNP may have shrunk 30% in 1992. Tokyo Kyodo wire service, March 31, 1993. 14 Nicholas Eberstadt, "Can the Two Koreas be One?" Foreign Affairs. Winter 1992/93, p.154. 15 The Asia Society, op.cit., p.6. 16 Significantly, both Pyongyang and Seoul agree that relations betwe...
